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Introduction
On November 4, 2013, health care giant Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay more than
$2.2 billion to resolve criminal and civil allegations of off-label marketing of three of its
prescription drugs: Risperdal, Invega, and Natrecor.1 The civil settlement with federal and
several state governments totaled $1.72 billion.2 Further, criminal fines and forfeitures reached
$485 million. This settlement was the second largest health care fraud settlement in United States
history.3 Less than four months later, Endo Health Solutions, Inc. and its subsidiary, Endo
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., agreed to pay $192.7 million to resolve criminal and civil claims for the
off-label promotion of the drug, Lidoderm. 4 In a statement about the settlement, Zane D.
Memeger,

United

States

Attorney

for

the

Eastern

District

of Pennsylvania,

stated,

“pharmaceutical companies have a legal obligation to promote their drugs for only FDAapproved uses.”5 But what about their constitutional right to free speech? The United States

Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice, “Johnson & Johnson to Pay More Than $2.2 Billion to Resolve
Criminal and Civil Investigations” (2013) (available at: http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/November/13-ag1170.html).
2 Id.
3 The largest health care fraud settlement involved GlaxoSmithKline when it pled guilty and agreed to pay $3 billion
to resolve claims of unlawfully promoting prescription drugs, failing to report safety data, and allegedly engaging in
false price reporting practices. Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice, “GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty
and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data” (2012) (available at:
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-civ-842.ht ml).
4 Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice, “Endo Pharmaceuticals and Endo Health Solutions to Pay $192.7
Million to Resolve Criminal and Civil Liability Relating to Marketing of Prescription Drug Lidoderm for
Unapproved Uses” (2013) (available at: http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/February/14-civ-187.ht ml).
5 Id.
1
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has been the only circuit to hold that truthful, nonmisleading off-label promotion is protected under the First Amendment in United States v.
Caronia.6 However, as evidenced by the recent Johnson & Johnson and Endo Health Solutions
settlements, the free speech defense introduced in Caronia does not seem to be too promising for
pharmaceutical companies faced with allegations of off-label promotion.
When the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided United States v.
Caronia in December 2012, the case was hailed as a “landmark” decision.7 Up until this
decision, no court has held that off-label promotion by pharmaceutical and medical device
manufacturers and their representatives was protected under the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment. This defense was not available when the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
prosecuted off-label promotion for violating the misbranding provisions of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). The defendant in Caronia was convicted of conspiring to introduce a
misbranded drug, Xyrem, into interstate commerce in violation of the FDCA. On appeal, the
defendant ultimately prevailed on the grounds that his off-label promotion of the drug was lawful
and protected under the First Amendment. In a 2-1 decision, the Second Circuit held that
prohibiting the lawful off-label marketing of a drug unconstitutionally restricted free speech.
Further, it held that the misbranding provision does not prohibit off-label promotion. It was the

6

United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012). There are no statutes which expressly prohibit off-label
promotion; Medical journals and physicians are not prohibited from off-label promotion. See Thea Cohen, The First
Amendment and the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Marketing: Challenges to the Constitutionality of the FDA’s
Interpretation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 49 A M. CRIM. L. REV. 1945, 1946 (2012)
7 See In Landmark Ruling, Court Reverses Conviction Involving Off-Label Promotion, FDA LAW BLOG, T HE
OFFICIAL BLOG OF HYMAN, PHELPS & MCNAMARA , P.C. (Dec. 3, 2012),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2012/12/in -land mark-ru ling-court-reverses-convictioninvolving-off-label-promotion.html; Robert Radick, Caronia And The First Amendment Defense to Off-Label
Marketing: A Six-Month Re-Assessment, FORBES M AG. (May 29, 2013, 12:05 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2013/05/29/caronia-and-the-first-amendment-defense-to-off-label-marketing-asix-month-re-assessment/.
2

first Federal Court of Appeals that interpreted the FDCA’s misbranding provision to not
expressly prohibit off-label promotion.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Caronia relied on the Supreme Court’s holding Sorrell
v. IMS Health, Inc. In Sorrell, the Supreme Court recognized that pharmaceutical speech is
commercial speech and therefore, is protected under the First Amendment. The Second Circuit
took it one step further and held that lawful off-label promotion of drugs is also protected speech.
The decisions in Sorrell and in Caronia appear to show an expansion in commercial speech
rights in the context of pharmaceutical and medical device marketing. However, based on case
law following the Caronia decision, it is unlikely that the decision will have a significant impact
on off-label promotion. Moreover, it does not appear that the decision will affect government
litigation tactics or enforcement efforts; numerous pharmaceutical manufacturers have pled
guilty to allegations of violating the FDCA by promoting off-label uses and have settled with the
government.
This Note will address whether the Second Circuit decision in Caronia has made an
impact on off-label litigation in other circuits and within the circuit itself. In addition, the Note
will focus on whether, as a response to the Second Circuit’s decision, the Federal Government
will change its strategies and tactics to enforce the misbranding provisions of the FDCA. It will
be argued that pharmaceutical manufacturers are doubtful of the power and persuasiveness of the
decision in Caronia and thus, are unwilling to assert the free speech defense in off-label
prosecutions. Furthermore, this Note will assert that despite the expansion of pharmaceutical
speech following Sorrell and Caronia, the Second Circuit’s decision has had a limited persuasive
impact on other circuits. This is because pharmaceutical companies do not believe that they are
shielded from liability based on First Amendment protection. As a response, the federal
3

government has not changed its litigation strategies. In addition, the government will continue to
hold that off-label promotion violates the misbranding provisions of the FDCA.
Part I of this Note will discuss the background of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act and
the misbranding provisions. This section will conclude with a discussion of the views of the FDA
regarding off-label use and promotion. Part II of this Note focuses on the First Amendment right
to free speech and the evolution of commercial speech. Part III covers an analysis of United
States v. Caronia. Part IV addresses the implications of the Caronia decision and will include a
circuit-by-circuit review of cases which have cited to the Second Circuit’s decision. Part V will
analyze the effect of the decision on prosecution of off-label promotion under the FDCA by
discussing settlements for off-label promotion against pharmaceutical manufacturers. Part VI
will be the conclusion; it will summarize the conclusions of the Note and will introduce an
alternative prosecution tactic against pharmaceutical companies for consideration.
Part I: Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and Off-Label Promotion
Before entering interstate commerce, new drugs are subject to approval from the Food
and Drug Administration to be marketed for specific uses.8 Once a drug is approved by the FDA,
physicians are free to prescribe it for approved and unapproved, or “off-label, uses.”9 Under the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), introducing any adulterated or misbranded drug into
interstate commerce is prohibited.10 A drug is considered misbranded if its label does not bear

8

21 U.S.C. § 355 (a).
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, “Use of Approved Drugs for Unlabeled Indications”, 12 FDA drug bulletin 4
(April 1982)
10 21 U.S.C. § 331 (a).
9

4

adequate directions for use.11 “Adequate directions for use” is defined as directions under which
laypersons “may use the drug safely and for the purposes for which it is intended.”12
“Off-label use” refers to the use of a drug, or other product, in a way that is not indicated
on its FDA-approved label.13 This term is applied when a drug is used to treat a disease not
indicated on the FDA-approved label. The term is also applied when treating the indicated
disease but prescribing the drug for a different dosage or prescribing it to a different patient
population than indicated on the FDA-approved label.14 Contrary to popular belief, off-label use
is not itself a “risk” and not all off-label use is experimental.15
The FDA has conflated the definition of “off-label promotion” with “misbranding” and
has prosecuted pharmaceutical companies for off-label conduct alone; the two terms are used
interchangeably.16 Following the 2012 decision in United States v. Caronia, the Federal
Government has explained that off-label use is only evidence of misbranding.17 It argues that
promoting an off-label use is evidence that the speaker is asserting an intended use. Because it is
off-label, the labeling of the drug does not bear adequate directions for this off-label use.
“Intended uses” is defined as the “objective intent of persons legally responsible for the labeling
of drugs.”18 This objective intent may be evidenced by a person’s expressions by “labeling
claims,

advertising

matter,

or

oral or written statements by such persons or their

11

21 U.S.C. § 352 (f).
21 C.F.R. § 201.5.
13 Thea Cohen, The First Amendment and the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Marketing: Challenges to the
Constitutionality of the FDA’s Interpretation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1945,
1946 (2012).
14 James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and
Misconception, 53 Food Drug L.J. 71, n.2 at 71 (1998) (citing William L. Christopher, Off-Label Drug Prescription:
Filling the Regulatory Vacuum, 48 Food & Drug L.J. 247, 248 (1993)).
15 Id at *72.
16 Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice “Amgen Inc. Pleads Guilty to Federal Charge in Brooklyn, N.Y.;
Pays $762 Million to Resolve Criminal Liability and False Claims Act Allegations (2012).
17 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
18 21 C.F.R. 201.128.
12
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representatives.”19 Evidence of objective intent may also be shown by the circumstances
surrounding the distribution of the product, such as whether it was offered and used for a purpose
that was not labeled or advertised.20
While off-label promotion has been conflated with misbranding, the prohibition against
off-label promotion is mainly directed at pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers and
their agents.21 Other individuals and entities, such as medical journals and ordinary persons, are
permitted to express whatever ideas and opinions they have about off-label use.22 With these
speakers, their promotion and discussions of off-label use has been acknowledged by the FDA to
be of “high value” in the practice of medicine.23 Off-label uses of drugs and medical devices are
important in many areas of medicine, which “may account for more than 25 percent of
approximately 1.6 billion prescriptions written each year with some recent estimates running as
high as 60 percent.”24 The FDA has acknowledged that under certain circumstances, off-label
use may be appropriate.25 Such usage may even constitute a medically necessary standard of
care.26 The FDA has expressed reluctance to interfere with the practice of medicine or create
barriers to physicians exercising their best judgment when considering treatment options for
patients.27 The FDCA expressly states that none of the provisions of the Act “shall be construed

19

Id.
Id.
21 Thea Cohen, The First Amendment and the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Marketing: Challenges to the
Constitutionality of the FDA’s Interpretation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act , 49 A M. CRIM. L. REV. 1945,
1946 (2012).
22 Id (quoting Ralph F. Hall & Elizabeth S. Sobotka, Comment, Inconsistent Government Policies: Why FDA OffLabel Regulation Cannot Survive First Amendment Review Under Greater New Orleans, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1.,
8 (2007).
23 Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1989).
24 Id at *78 (quoting Lars A. Noah, Constraints on Off-Label Uses, 16(2) J. PROD & TOXICS LIAB. 139, 139 (1994).
25 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Drug Bulletin, 12 FDA Drug Bull. 1, 5 (1982).
26 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Draft Guidance, Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical
Journal Articles and Medical or Scientific Reference Publi cation on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs and
Approved or Cleared Medical Devices (2009).
27 Weaver, 886 F.2d at 198.
20
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to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any
legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health-carepractitioner-patient relationship.”28
Off-label use has been connected to treatments for medical conditions such as “cancer,
heart and circulatory disease, AIDS, kidney diseases requiring dialysis, osteoporosis, spinal
fusion surgery, and various uncommon disease.”29 In addition, a majority of the drugs prescribed
or administered to children are off-label because of the absence of clinical studies involving
children.30 Judicial courts have even recognized the public value of using drugs for appropriate
off-label uses.31 The Supreme Court stated that the off-label use of medical devices “is an
accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate this area without directly
interfering with the practice of medicine.”32 The medical and scientific community has also
recognized the importance of off-label use.33
While the FDA has given medical practitioners wide discretion in off-label use and
promotion, the promotion of off-label uses of drugs by manufacturers and their representatives is
not as freely accepted. Although the FDCA and its provisions do not expressly prohibit off-label
statements,

marketing

and

promotional

statements

by

pharmaceutical

companies

and

representatives can be evidence of a drug’s intended use and therefore, proof of an intended use
that was not FDA-approved.34 The government has been adamant about prosecuting

28

21 U.S.C. § 396.
Id (citations omitted).
30 Id n. 81 (citing ROBERT LEVINE , ET HICS AND REGULAT ION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 239 (2d ed. 1986).
31 See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001).
32 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 351 (2001).
33 James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and
Misconception, 53 FOOD DRUG L.J. 71, 78 (1998).
34 21 C.F.R. §201.5
29
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manufacturers and their representatives for off-label promotion.35 The FDA issued 42 regulatory
notices and demanded that a number of drug manufacturers cease circulating information about
off-label uses between 2003 to 2007.36 During this time period, the Department of Justice settled
eleven criminal and civil cases involving off-label promotion.37
Part II: Free Speech and the Evolution of Commercial Speech
Commercial speech is speech that advertises something of an economic nature. 38 It is
related to a transaction involving the economic interests of the speaker and the listener.39
Generally, commercial speech is given a lot of protection under the Constitution, but it is given
less protection than content-based speech.40 However, if the commercial speech is false and
misleading, it is not protected under the First Amendment, and the government has the right to
punish the speaker.41 The government also has the power to regulate truthful, non-deceptive
commercial speech, such as gambling, liquor ads, and lawyer ads. 42 Prior to 1976, commercial
speech was not protected under the First Amendment.43 However, in Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council the Supreme Court reversed the decision in
Valentine v. Crestensen and held that under the First Amendment, the public has the right to
receive information regarding the prices of prescription drugs through advertising and other

35

Thea Cohen, The First Amendment and the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Marketing: Challenges to the
Constitutionality of the FDA’s Interpretation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act , 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1945,
1946 (2012).
36 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Highlights, Prescription Drugs: FDA’s Oversight of the Promotion of Drugs for
Off-Label Uses (July 2008).
37 Id.
38 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
39 Id.
40 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
41 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
42 See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1997); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517
U.S. 484 (1996); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
43 See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
8

promotional methods.44 The Court held that this information was valuable and even though it
was “commercial,” it was “of general public interest.”45 The public has the right to be wellinformed in order to make intelligent decisions46 ; therefore, there must a “free flow of
commercial information.”47
The Supreme Court then introduced a four-prong test to guide the courts in determining
whether the commercial speech at issue is protected under the First Amendment. 48 First, the
speech must concern lawful activity and must not be misleading; second, there must be a
substantial government interest; third, the regulation must advance the government interest; and
finally, the fit between the legislative ends and means to accomplish this must be narrowly
tailored.49 In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., the Supreme Court held that Rhode Island did not have
the broad discretion to suppress truthful, non-misleading information for paternalistic purposes. 50
The Court held that the dissemination of truthful and non-misleading commercial information
pertaining to lawful products and services was protected under the First Amendment.51
Specifically, these types of messages are accorded strict scrutiny; “unlike content-neutral
restrictions on time, place, or manner of expression,” complete speech bans preclude alternative
modes of disseminating information and thus, they require a more rigorous form of review.52
Moreover, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Supreme Court found that the
government had a substantial interest in preventing underage smoking, but the sale and use of

44

Id.
Id at 764.
46 Id at 765.
47 Id.
48 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
49 Id.
50 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996).
51 Id at 496.
52 Id at 501.
45

9

tobacco products by adults is legal. 53 The Attorney General failed to prove that the outdoor
advertising ban was not more extensive than necessary, under the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test.54 The Court held that the public has an interest in receiving this information. 55
The Supreme Court has expanded corporate free speech rights in the context of
pharmaceutical speech—the level of protection has increased and the scope of activity defined as
“speech” has broadened.56 In Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, Congress enacted the
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act; this Act exempted compounded drugs from
the FDA drug approval process if the drug providers did not advertise them. 57 The Supreme
Court held that the advertising restriction was unconstitutional. 58 The trend in the history of
commercial speech appears to be constantly expanding what qualifies as commercial speech and
to allow advertising if it is truthful and non-misleading.59
In 2011, the Supreme Court held that pharmaceutical speech is protected under the First
Amendment.60 The decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. shows an expansion of commercial
speech because the Supreme Court found that speech relating to information and pricing of
pharmaceuticals was a form of commercial speech. 61 The expansion of the definition of
commercial speech is evidence that the Supreme Court continues to be highly protective of
commercial speech.

53

533 U.S. 525 (2001).
Id.
55 Id.
56 Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002; Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. 131 S. Ct. 2653
(2011).
57 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002)
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011). See infra Part III for a discussion of the facts and
holding of Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.
61 Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672.
54
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Part III: Analysis of United States v. Caronia
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. represents an expansion of
commercial free speech rights for two reasons. First, the level of protection offered has
increased.62 Second, the scope of activity defined as “speech” was broadened in the context of
pharmaceutical speech.63 Subsequently, the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Caronia was heavily influenced by the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell. There, the Supreme
Court held that pharmaceutical marketing constitutes speech that is protected under the First
Amendment.64 The Supreme Court found that the Vermont Law, § 4631(d), which barred
pharmaceutical manufacturers and representatives from using prescriber-identifiable information
for marketing or promoting a drug, violated the First Amendment. 65 The Court utilized a twopart test to reach its holding, which first asks whether the law enacted content-based and speakerbased restrictions. Next, the Court applied the Central Hudson four-part test.66 The Vermont
legislation was found to be a content-based restriction because it disfavored pharmaceutical
marketing; the speech was barred if it was used for marketing but not if it was used for
educational communications.67 The Sorrell Court found it was also a speaker-based restriction
because

it

barred

only

pharmaceutical

manufacturers

and

representatives—specifically

detailers—from communicating the information.68 The two-part test utilized by the Supreme
Court was ultimately adopted by the Second Circuit in United States v. Caronia.69

62

Seth E. Mermin & Samantha K. Graff, The First Amendment and Public Health, At Odds, 39 Am. J. L. and Med.
298, 299 (2013).
63 Id.
64 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670 (2011).
65 Id at 2672.
66 Id at 2663-2672.
67 Id at 2663.
68 Id.
69 703 F.3d 149, 163 (2012).
11

In United States v. Caronia, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York convicted a pharmaceutical sales representative, Alfred Caronia, of introducing a
misbranded drug, Xyrem, into interstate commerce.70 Xyrem is a sleep-inducing depressant that
was first approved in July 2002 to treat cataplexy, a condition associated with narcolepsy.71 In
November 2005, the drug was approved to treat excessive daytime sleepiness in patients
suffering from narcolepsy.72

The active ingredient in Xyrem is gamma-hydroxybutryate

(“GHB”),73 and the drug has been found to have serious potential side effects.74 The claims
against Caronia arise from interactions with two physicians. To one physician, Caronia informed
him that Xyrem could be used to treat fibromyalgia, muscle disorders, chronic pain and fatigue—
all of which are off-label uses.75 To another physician, Caronia recommended the drug not only
for fibromyalgia, but also for sleepiness, weight loss and chronic fatigue, which are off-label
uses as well .76
Caronia was found guilty of misbranding Xyrem by promoting its off-label uses in
violation of the misbranding provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act. 77 Caronia
appealed the conviction, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
and vacated the conviction.78 The Second Circuit held that Caronia’s off-label promotion of
Xyrem was protected under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 79 Further, the Court
held that the government prosecution of pharmaceutical companies and their agents for the

70

576 F. Supp. 2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id at 388.
72 Id at 388-389.
73 Id at 388.
74 Id at 389.
75 Id.
76 Id at 390.
77 Id.
78 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
79 Id.
71

12

promotion of truthful, non-misleading off-label uses of a drug was a violation of their First
Amendment rights.80
The Court in Caronia used the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell, which was decided
after the Eastern District of New York convicted Alfred Caronia, in order to guide its decision.
Applying the two-part test introduced in Sorrell, the Second Circuit found that Caronia’s offlabel promotion to the two physicians was protected under the First Amendment. The Court
found that making off-label promotion unlawful is a content-based restriction because it
criminalizes only speech that concerns unapproved uses. 81 In addition, it is a speaker-based
restriction because it criminalizes the speech only when the speaker is a pharmaceutical
representative or agent not when it is a physician. 82 Applying the Central Hudson four-part test,
the Court found that the Government had substantial interests in protecting the public from
possibly unsafe and ineffective drugs. 83 However, preventing a class of people, namely, the
pharmaceutical companies

and

their representatives, from engaging in truthful off-label

promotion of drugs would not directly further these government interests. 84 Finally, the Court
held that the government’s regulation was not narrowly tailored to achieving the interests
asserted because it was more extensive than necessary.85
The decisions in Sorrell and Caronia show an expansion in the commercial free speech
doctrine because the definition of “commercial speech” includes pharmaceutical speech, and this

80

Id.
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
82 Id.
83 Id at 166.
84 Id.
85 Id at 167.
81

13

speech is protected under the First Amendment.86 The Caronia decision was hailed as a
landmark case that gave rise to a circuit split between the Second Circuit and every other Federal
Circuit because the Second Circuit was the only one to hold that off-label promotion was
protected free speech under the First Amendment. The decision was likely regarded as a
“landmark”

decision

because

it

created

a

Constitutional

defense

for

pharmaceutical

manufacturers and their agents in actions alleging violation of provisions of the FDCA based on
off-label promotion. Until the Second Circuit’s decision in Caronia it appeared that the FDA
enjoyed immense power in the enforcement of the misbranding provisions and the prosecution of
off-label promotion as evidenced by the large settlements against pharmaceutical companies.87
Some pharmaceutical manufacturers have relied on Caronia to to assert the Free Speech defense
that their off-label marketing was constitutionally protected and did not violate the FDCA. It is
now apparent that “landmark” was too ambitious of a word to describe the Caronia decision; this
defense has not been universally successful in all cases where it was asserted.88
Part IV: Implications of Caronia
Since the Second Circuit’s decision in 2012, some pharmaceutical manufacturers have
asserted that off-label marketing is constitutionally protected speech and is not a violation of the
FDCA. This defense, however, has not been universally successful. 89 Some courts adopted the
Caronia decision,90 while others found it nonpersuasive. 91 The Caronia decision demonstrates an

86

Mark J. Scheineson & Guillermo Cuevas, United States v. Caronia The Increasing Strength of Commercial Free
Speech and Potential New Emphasis on Classifying Off-Label Promotion as “False and Misleading,” 68 FOOD
DRUG L.J. 201 (2013).
87 See Katherine A. Blair, In This Issue, In Search of the Right R[x]: Use of the Federal False Claims Act in OffLabel Drug Promotion Litigation, 23 HEALT H LAWYER 44 (2001).
88 See infra Part IV.
89 See infra Part IV.
90 See Dawson v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-663-JFA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112877, at *2 (D.S.C. 2013); OtisWisher v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88813, at *17 (D. Vt. 2013); Gavin v. Medtronic,
14

expansion in commercial speech rights in the context of pharmaceutical and medical device
marketing, but the case law following the decision suggests the decision will not significantly
impact off-label promotion.
Although the defendant in Caronia was a sales representative for a pharmaceutical
company, the decision of the Second Circuit has been used exclusively by medical device
companies as a defense during litigation. pharmaceutical drugs, Medical device manufacturers,
like pharmaceutical manufacturers, must abide by the provisions of the FDCA and follow FDA
regulations and procedures. Nonetheless, there are differences in FDA processes for new drug
approval and for new medical device approval for marketing and use in interstate commerce.
New drugs undergo three stages of clinical testing via the Investigational New Drug
(“IND”) process.92 If testing concludes that a drug is safe and effective, the manufacturer can
submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”).93 The FDA often approves or clears new drugs with
the knowledge that the drugs will likely used for off-label indications, especially when the
practice of good medicine requires that a physician use drugs “according to [his] best knowledge
and judgment.94
There a two ways in which the FDA approves the marketing of a new medical device; the
medical device can receive 510(k) clearance or it can receive premarket approval. 510(k) is a
premarketing submission to the FDA that a device is substantially equivalent to a legally

Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101216, at *15 (E.D. La 2013); Lawrence v. Medtronic, Inc., 2013 Minn. Dist. LEXIS
3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2013).
91 See Ramirez v. Medtronic, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118822 (D. Ariz. 2013); Carson v. Depuy Spine, Inc. 365
Fed. App’x 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2010); McDonald-Lerner v. Neurocare Assocs, P.A., No. 373859-V, 2013 Md. Cir.
Ct. LEXIS 6, at *3 (Md. Cir. Ct. 2013).
92 Id at 73.
93 Id.
94 Id.
15

marketed device.95 A medical device receives 510(k) clearance if the product can be
demonstrated to be substantially equivalent to a device that either was in distribution prior to the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA), or was grandfathered in statutorily, or was
otherwise being marketed legally. 96 The “vast majority of devices” are cleared by the FDA
through this 510(k) process because the history of other substantially equivalent devices is an
indication of its safety and effectiveness.97
The premarket approval (PMA) process is lengthier and more rigorous than the 510(k)
process because there is “no history of equivalent predicate device to serve as an indicator of
safety and effectiveness.”98 Not only is this process more complicated, but it is also more costly
to device manufacturers and can take years before it is FDA-approved.99 Additionally, a medical
device manufacturer can also seek an exemption by applying for an Investigational Device
Exemption (IDE), which is a process that allows otherwise unapproved medical devices products
to be used to investigate the safety and effectiveness of the product. 100
Three federal courts in the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, and a Minnesota state court
have adopted the holding in Caronia that the FDCA does not expressly prohibit off-label
promotion.101 Courts in these jurisdictions have reiterated that off-label promotion is not a
violation of the FDCA. However, other jurisdictions have held that off-label promotion is a
violation of the Act. The Ninth Circuit follows circuit precedence and continues to hold that off95
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label promotion is a violation of the misbranding provisions of the FDCA. 102 A Maryland state
court agrees with the dissent in Caronia and refuses to hold that off-label promotion is not
prohibited under the FDCA.103
Recently, Medtronic, Inc. has faced numerous lawsuits involving its InFuse Bone
Graft/LT-Cage Lumbar Tapered Fusion Device (“InFuse Device). As a defense, the medical
technology company has utilized the Second Circuit’s holding that off-label promotion does not
violate the FDCA. The InFuse Device is a Class III device manufactured and marketed by
Medtronic, Inc., a medical technology company. The InFuse device consists of three
components: a recombinant human bone morphogenetic protein-2 (“rhBMP-2”), an absorbable
collagen sponge, and an interbody fusion device.104 The device was approved by the FDA after
the FDA conducted its rigorous premarket approval (“PMA”) process. 105 The device is implanted
into the vertebrae and has been approved by the FDA for anterior insertion through the
abdomen.106
The plaintiffs in the InFuse Device lawsuits against Medtronic, Inc. contended that it was
the off-label promotion by Medtronic representatives to physicians that induced the physicians to
perform their spinal fusion surgeries using off-label methods.107 Specifically, the plaintiffs allege
that the representatives encouraged the surgeons to implant only one component in the InFuse
Device system, instead of all three components, and to use a posterior approach during surgery,
102
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rather than the FDA-approved anterior approach.108 Plaintiffs claim that the off-label promotion
of the device was executed without fully disclosing all the adverse effects and risks of the offlabel uses.109 The plaintiffs further assert that these two off-label approaches caused them to
suffer from resultant injuries.110 These injuries range from severe bone growth, pain, numbness,
and difficulties with certain motor function.111
Several United States District Courts, and a Minnesota state court have followed the
Second Circuit’s decision. These courts have held that off-label promotion is not unlawful under
the misbranding provision of the FDCA, and subsequently rejected the off-label promotion and
use claims asserted by plaintiffs. The courts eventually recognized that the FDCA does not
prohibit all promotion of off-label uses.112 The United States District Courts and the Minnesota
state court identified Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm. as binding authority. The Supreme
Court held that physicians are able to prescribe drugs and devices for off-label uses.113 Moreover,
the Court recognized the importance of not interfering with the practice of medicine and
allowing doctors to prescribe drugs and devices for uses that have not been approved by the
FDA.114
In the above referenced InFuse Device cases, the plaintiffs failed to establish a link
between off-label promotion and their alleged injuries. They could not state specific statements
made by Medtronic, Inc. or its agents, which induced the surgeons to use the Infuse Device and
perform the surgery in an off-label way. Since plaintiffs could not identify specific instances of
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off-label promotion to the surgeons, these courts adhered to the Supreme Court presumption in
Buckman that physicians have the discretion to use drugs and medical devices in off-label ways
as long as they are an appropriate course of treatment. 115
In Dawson v. Medtronic, Inc. the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, in the Fourth Circuit, rejected plaintiff’s claim that off-label promotion was illegal
under the FDCA.116 Because the Court refused to accept this assertion, plaintiff failed to specify
what other federal law the off-label promotion allegedly conducted by Medtronic would be
violating.117 Additionally, the Court held that if state law proscribed such conduct, it would be
preempted because it is not unlawful under traditional state tort law. 118
Following the decision of Caronia, a court in the Second Circuit followed circuit
precedence and held that off-label promotion is not unlawful under the Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act. The District Court for Vermont held that because the claims against Medtronic,
Inc. failed to identify the specific federal requirement violated under the Act, the claims were
preempted.119 The District Court acknowledged that misbranding is criminal under the FDCA,
but the plaintiff in this case did not allege any misbranding.120 She failed to plead with
particularity since “bare bones allegations do not satisfy Rule 9(b).”121
In Gavin v. Medtronic, Inc., the plaintiff in this case also did not satisfy the requirement
for the claim to escape preemption because plaintiff could not assert a parallel claim that was
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pled with particularly.122 Specifically, plaintiff did not explain how violating the federal
requirement caused his alleged injuries. The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana specified that under §360(k), the question is not “whether there are federal
requirements applicable to a particular use of a device,” but rather “whether there are federal
requirements applicable to the device” (emphases in the original).123 The decision further
explained that neither the language of §360(k)(a) or the Supreme Court’s decision in Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc. suggested that preemption depends on how the device is promoted. 124
A Minnesota state court adopted the holding in Caronia when the plaintiffs in the case
sought judgment against Medtronic, Inc.125 The plaintiffs alleged that defendant Medtronic, Inc.
and its agents promoted the off-label use of the InFuse system by illegally inducing surgeons to
only one component of the three-component InFuse system.126 This off-label use allegedly
resulted in injury to the plaintiffs and required them to undergo additional surgeries.127 The
Minnesota District Court conceded with the majority in Caronia that federal law does not
prohibit all promotion of off-label uses.128
Medtronic, Inc. has not been equally successful when asserting the Caronia decision as a
defense in other jurisdictions. In 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that off-label promotion is illegal under the provisions of the FDCA. 129 Following the
Second Circuit’s decision in 2012, two district courts in the Ninth Circuit followed their circuit
precedent and found that off-label promotion by Medtronic, Inc. was illegal under the
122
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FDCA.130 Medtronic attempted to rely on the interpretation of the misbranding provision in
Caronia, but the argument was ultimately struck down by the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona and the United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
which are not bound the Second Circuit.131 The two district courts held that the FDA has
construed the FDCA as prohibiting off-label promotional speech as misbranding itself, and the
Ninth Circuit remains deferential to the decisions of the FDA. 132
In a case brought before the Circuit Court of Maryland, a state court, Medtronic Inc.
again relied on the Second Circuit’s decision in Caronia and contended that off-label use and
promotion is neither illegal nor improper under the FDCA.133 The Circuit Court of Maryland
found that the majority opinion in Caronia was unpersuasive, and thus, it “decline[d] to follow
the reasoning of the . . . majority.”134 The Maryland state court instead agreed with the dissenting
judge in Caronia that finding that off-label promotion is not a violation of the FDCA would
frustrate the purpose of the FDA’s stringent labeling regulations and premarket approval process
for drugs.135 The court went on to find that this purpose would be compromised by allowing
manufacturers and their sales representatives to have broad discretion to promote off-label uses
to physicians.136
Although the adoption of the Caronia holding in the Fourth and Fifth Circuit, as well as
in a Minnesota state court would appear to be evidence of the persuasiveness of the holding in
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Caronia, this is not the opinion held by all courts. The Ninth Circuit decisions in a number of
InFuse Device cases, and a decision by a Maryland state court reveal that the Second Circuit’s is
neither binding nor persuasive on courts outside that circuit. Moreover, off-label promotion can
continue to be illegal under the provisions of the FDCA.
Part V: Effect of Caronia on Government Prosecution of Off-label Promotion
The first pharmaceutical off-label settlement post-Caronia involved Pfizer Inc. for
misbranding its drug, Protonix.137 On December 12, 2012, just days after the Caronia decision,
Pfizer agreed to pay $55 million in order to resolve allegations that Wyeth L.L.C. introduced the
misbranded drug into interstate commerce.138 Protonix has FDA-approval to treat short-term
erosive esophagitis.139 However, the United States alleged that the Pfizer intended to and did
promote the drug for all forms of gastro-esophageal reflux disease (“GERD”).140 The FDA
warned Wyeth that its proposed promotional materials were misleading because the company
was overstating the uses for which the drug was actually approved by suggesting that it was safe
for treating GERD.141 In its complaint, the government alleged that Wyeth ignored the FDA
warning notice by actively training its sales force to promote the drug for all forms of GERD.142
Furthermore, the government contended that Wyeth promoted Protonix as the “best” for
nighttime heartburn despite the lack of clinical evidence that it has superior efficacy over other
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products.143 Finally, Wyeth was allegedly using continuing medical education programs as a
vehicle to promote Protonix for off-label uses.144
Within the same month of Caronia, Amgen, Inc. settled with the federal government and
pled guilty before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to
illegally introducing the misbranded drug, Aranesp, into interstate commerce.145 In addition, it
agreed to pay $762 million to resolve criminal and civil liability from the sale and promotion of
certain drugs.146 The drug was approved by the FDA at certain doses for particular patient
populations suffering from anemia, but in order to increase its profits, Amgen, Inc. promoted it
for a dosage that was rejected by the FDA. 147 The government alleged that to the company
instructed its sales representatives in “reactive marketing” by inducing doctors to ask about offlabel uses.148 This tactic was used to ensure the company did not outwardly promote the drugs
for off-label uses and thus, would not violate the misbranding provision of the FDCA. 149 Because
this action was brought before the Eastern District of New York, the Caronia decision would
have been binding on this court. However, Amgen, Inc. did not attempt to assert the Free Speech
defense, nor did it attempt to argue that its off-label promotion of Aranesp was not prohibited by
the FDCA.
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In its Megace ES settlement, Par Pharmaceuticals agreed to pay $45 million to resolve
civil and criminal claims, and it pled guilty to misbranding Megace ES in violation of FDCA.150
Megace ES was approved by FDA “to treat anorexia, cachexia, or other significant weight loss
suffered by patients with AIDS.”151 The company was charged with misbranding because it
promoted or intended to promote the drug for non-AIDS-related geriatric wasting which is a use
not approved by the FDA.152 The United States asserted that the company deliberately targeted
elderly nursing home patients with weight loss, even though it was allegedly aware of the drug’s
adverse effects in elderly patients.153 The United States further contended that the company made
substantiated and misleading representations about their drug in order to encourage providers to
prescribe Megace ES over the generic alternative;154 the company had no well-controlled studies
to substantiate their claims of the greater efficacy of their drug. 155
Six months after the decision in Caronia, the Second Circuit encountered its second
settlement against a pharmaceutical company for off-label promotion.156 Before District Court
for the Western District of New York, ISTA Pharmaceuticals, Inc. agreed to pay $33.5 million to
resolve criminal and civil liability for conspiring “to introduce a misbranded drug into interstate
commerce” with the intention that its drug, Xibrom, be promoted for unapproved uses.157
Xibrom was FDA-approved to treat pain and inflammation following cataract surgery. 158 Some
of the pharmaceutical representatives of ISTA Pharmaceuticals promoted the drug for use
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following Lasik and glaucoma surgeries and for the treatment of cystoid mascular edema.159
ISTA pled guilty based on evidence that some of its employees were instructed not to leave a
“paper trail” from interactions with physicians regarding unapproved new uses of the drug.160
The government alleged that: ISTA employees promoted the drug for off-label uses; CME
programs were used to promote uses that were not approved by FDA as safe and effective; and
post-operative instruction sheets for off-label uses were paid for by company employees and
given to physicians.161 Similar to Amgen, Inc. in its Aranesp settlement, ISTA Pharmaceuticals
also decided to settle with the government and plead guilty to allegations of off-label promotion
rather than to assert Caronia as a defense.
In July 2013, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Inc. paid $490.9 Million to resolve criminal and
civil claims arising from unlawful marketing of its drug, Rapamune, for uses that were not
approved by the FDA as safe and effective.162 The drug received FDA-approval for use in kidney
transplant patients.163 However, the information alleged that the company promoted the drug to
non-renal transplant patients.164 The government also asserted that Wyeth provided its sale
representatives with training material on off-label uses and instructed them how to present this
material to

physicians to

increase.165

Wyeth created financial incentives to the sales

representatives, and it was evidence of valuing profit over consumer safety.166
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Two months after Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Rapamune settlement, Abbott Laboratories,
Inc. settled with U.S. Department of Justice for the promotion of its drug, Depakote, for
unapproved uses.167 The total settlement amount was $1.5 billion, which was the largest singledrug settlement of an off-label case up to that date.168 Abbott Laboratories was prosecuted for the
unlawful promotion for the drug for uses not approved as safe and effective by the FDA.169 The
drug company pled guilty to misbranding the drug.170 On November 4, 2013, the Department of
Justice reported that Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay more than $2.2 billion to resolve criminal
and civil investigations.171 The allegations against the health care giant included off-label
promotion of the drugs, Risperdal, Invega, and Natrecor, and providing kickbacks to doctors and
pharmacists.172 This settlement was the second largest health care fraud settlement in United
States history with criminal fines and forfeiture totaling $485 million, and with a civil settlement
with the federal government and several states totaling $1.72 billion.173 The statement by
Attorney General, Eric Holder, that this settlement “demonstrates the Justice department’s firm
commitment to preventing and combating all forms of health care fraud,” reveals that the FDA
and the Department of Justice were not hindered by the Second Circuit’s decision in Caronia in
prosecuting off-label promotion.174
Finally, in the most recent off-label promotion settlement—and certainly not the last—
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million to settle criminal and civil claims arising from the off-label promotion of its drug,
Liboderm.175 The information alleges that Endo promoted the drug for the off-label uses of
treating low back pain, diabetic neuropathy and carpal tunnel. 176 The drug was only FDAapproved to relieve pain associated with post-herpetic neuralgia, which is a complication of
shingles.177 The action against Endo was brought in the District Court for the Northern District of
New York, which is within the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit. Not unlike, Amgen, Inc. and
Wyeth pharmaceuticals, Endo chose to defer prosecution and settle with the government rather
than assert the Caronia decision at trial. In regards to the settlement with Endo, Assistant
Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Civil Division, Stuart Delery, stated that the
government “will hold accountable those who circumvent that process in pursuit of financial
gain.”178 Assistant Attorney General Delery’s statement reinforces the point that prosecution
against pharmaceutical manufacturers for off-label promotion was not significantly impacted by
the Second Circuit’s decision in Caronia.
A tension exists between ensuring public health and mandating that drugs introduced into
the marketplace are approved by the FDA. However, because physicians are not precluded from
promoting off-label uses of drugs, a First Amendment free speech violation may exist owing to
the fact that pharmaceutical manufacturers are not given the same freedom. The difference
between these two groups is attributable to the presumption that physicians promote off-label
uses to serve the best interests of the patient. In contrast, it is presumed that pharmaceutical
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companies and their agents are motivated to promote off-label uses to increase profit,
irrespective of the safety of the consumers. By promoting drugs for off-label uses, dosages, and
non-approved patient populations, the drug companies can reach a broader range of consumers
and thus, increase profits significantly. Although, speaker-based and content-based restrictions
may exist when prosecuting a pharmaceutical company and its agents for off-label marketing, the
safety and efficacy of a drug may will outweigh any interests in free speech rights.
Over a year has passed since United States v. Caronia. What was once hailed as a
landmark decision, and what appeared to be an expansion in pharmaceutical speech, has had
little persuasive effect on the prosecution of off-label drug promotion by pharmaceutical
companies. The government has remained steadfast in its commitment to prosecute for violations
under the misbranding provision of the FDCA and in targeting companies that promote drugs for
uses that have not been approved by the FDA. Since Caronia, numerous pharmaceutical
companies have settled with the government for allegations of misbranding through off-label
promotion, including two settlements in the Second Circuit itself. Because settlements with
pharmaceutical companies for off-label marketing have been so successful, there is little reason
for the Department of Justice to abandon its tactic of aggressive prosecution. 179 Not only will
government continue to prosecute off-label promotion and regard it as a per se violation of the
misbranding provision, but pharmaceutical manufacturers are also not optimistic that the Second
Circuit’s decision will be a useful defense. Instead, pharmaceutical companies appear to prefer to
settle and plead guilty.
The government decided not to bring the Second Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court
for further review. It did not believe that the Caronia decision will impact the FDA’s ability to
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enforce the FDCA’s drug misbranding provisions. 180 The likely reasons for the government’s
unwillingness to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court are two-fold. First, the Second
Circuit’s decision in Caronia did not question the validity of the misbranding provisions of the
FDCA or find a conflict between these provisions and the First Amendment. Secondly, the
Second Circuit did not strike down the FDCA’s drug approval framework. Since the Caronia
decision is only binding on courts with the Second Circuit, the government may not want to risk
a broadly applicable decision by the Supreme Court—especially in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sorrell which is protective of pharmaceutical speech.
Part VI: Conclusion
Although the Caronia decision was initially hailed as a “landmark” case and regarded as
a victory for off-label and unapproved marketing, its impact has been limited. There is a circuit
split on the issue of whether off-label drug promotion is prohibited under the misbranding
provisions of the FDCA. Because the federal government has decided not to appeal the decision
and bring it before the Supreme Court, circuits in the United States have the authority to decide
the persuasiveness and applicability of the Second Circuit’s decision. In addition, the large
number of off-label promotion settlements with some of the nation’s largest pharmaceutical
manufacturers and distributors shows that Caronia did not impede the federal government’s
enforcement and prosecution of the misbranding provisions under the FDCA. Three settlements
following Caronia fell within the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit, where the Caronia decision
would be binding. Regardless, the three pharmaceutical companies pled guilty to misbranding
their respective drugs and ultimately settled with the government.
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Although such a situation is unlikely given the case law and actions against
pharmaceutical companies for off-label marketing since United States v. Caronia, if the FDA
was hindered by the decision in Caronia, it still has an alternate avenue which to prosecute for
off-label marketing. The federal government would be able to allege violations of the False
Claims Act (“FCA”) for off-label promotion. Under this alternative claim, the government could
allege that a pharmaceutical company promoted the sale and use of drugs for uses that are not
FDA-approved and not covered by the federal health care programs; thus, the promotion of offlabel uses would result in the submission of false claims. Regardless of whether the government
prosecutes off-label promotion under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act or under the False
Claims Act, it is evident that a free speech defense is weak at best. The “side effect,” or predicted
results, of the Caronia decision have not been as desirable as anticipated.
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